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Generally Accepted Accounting Standards: 
A Standards Overload for Smal I Business? 
One of the most controversial issues in the 
a c counting profession over the past few years has been 
labeled by some as the accounting standards overload and 
by others as the big GAAP I little GAAP debate. This 
controversy has arisen because, as a general rule, 
current accounting standards "apply to all companies 
with no distinction being made between sma l I and larg e 
companies or publically held and closely held c o mpanies" 
<Williams, p.1294). It is p o ssible that some accounting 
standards place an unnecessary burden on small and/or 
p r ivately held companies. It is suggested that 
a ccounting s tandards and their required dis c losu r es ha ve 
been formulated with large, publicl y held companies in 
mind and thus smal I and/or privately held busine s ses 
have had to incur c osts in ex ce ss of the benefits 
re c eived from complying with th e se standards. In 
addition, it i s held by critics of current accounting 
standards that users of the financial statements of 
smal I and/ o r nonp u blic companies are usually the owner s 
o f the busines s or bankers who are close to the business 
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and who have alternati ve sources of information 
a vailable to them; these users are not concerned with 
many of the complexities introduced by accounting 
standards. 
Proponents of current standards disagree with the 
critics. Proponents hold that it is not at all evident 
that the costs of complying with accounting standards 
exceed the benefits of complying, nor is it clear that 
the needs of the users of the financial statements of 
small and/or privately held companies differ 
significantly from the needs of the users of the 
financial statements of large, publicly held companies. 
In fact, mixed messages have been received from the 
various studies and surveys conducted to examine the 
al !edged standards overload problem. The controversy 
seems no more near resolution now than it did in 1974 
wh en the AICPA formed the Committee on Generally 
Ac cepted Accounting Principles for Smal !er and/or 
Closely Held Businesses. 
Various accountants and other businessmen who 
believe that a standards overload problem does indeed 
exist hav e offered an array of possible solutions to the 
problem. These suggested solutions include the 
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fol lowing: 1) simplifying Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles for al I companies, 2) providing additional 
disclosure relief for smal I and/or privately held 
companies, 3) providing accounting measurement relief 
for smal I and/or privately held companies, and 4) 
developing a simplified alternative basis of accounting 
for smal I and/or privately held companies. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue 
of the al !edged standards overload problem. This 
exploration can be accomplished by breaking the topic 
down into several key areas of discussion. To fully 
comprehend the nature of the problem, it is necessary to 
have some background on current generally accepted 
accounting standards (GAAP): what is the nature of 
current accounting standards and where do they get their 
authority?; what is the purpose of current accounting 
standards, and is this purpose served for both smal 1 
and/or privately held companies as wel I as for large, 
public companies? It is also necessary to have some 
background on the history of the controversy. The next 
logical step is to attempt to define the term "small 
business" -- a task not as easy as it would appear. The 
exploration of the problem continues with an analysis of 
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both the users of the information found on the financial 
statements of smal 1 and/or nonpublic companies and the 
users of the information found on the financial 
statements of large, public companies: are the users 
different?; do their needs for information differ? 
Next, an analysis of the costs and benefits of complying 
with current accounting standards is necessary: does the 
cost/benefit ratio differ for small and/or nonpublic 
companies and for large, public companies? Assuming 
that a standards overload problem does exist, a 
discussion of possible solutions to the problem is the 
final step. 
Generally accepted accounting standards (GAAP) are 
those standards that have substantial authoritative 
support; Carl E. Coles defines GAAP in the fol lowing 
manner: 
[GAAP is] a combination of definitions, 
concepts, methods, and procedures used in 
preparing financial statements ... [which] are 
established largely through the pronouncements 
issued by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board <FASB), the Securities and Exchange 
commission and various other regulatory 
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agencies (Coles, p.64) 
GAAP has also been defined as: 
the consensus at any time as to which economic 
resources and obligations should be recorded 
as assets and I iabi I ities, which changes in 
them should be recorded, when these changes 
should be recorded, how the recorded assets 
and liabilities and the changes in them should 
be measured, what information should be 
disclosed and how it should be disclosed, and 
which financial statements should be prepared 
(W il Iiams, p.12 quoting from AICPA Special Bui litan, 
Disclosures of Departures from Opinions of the 
Accounting Principles Board and APB Statement 
No. 4) . 
It is clear that the concepts of measurement and 
disclosure are important in the understanding of GAAP. 
In fact, accounting has been described as a measurement 
and disclosure discipline. "Measurement refers to the 
assignment of numbers to objects, such as inventories 
and plant assests, and events, such as purchases and 
sales" (Williams, p.78). Measurement allows the 
convenient use of numbers to convey certain objects and 
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events to interested parties. After accountants measure 
the the elements of the financial statements, the 
results of the measurments are disclosed to the users of 
the financial information in order to help them make 
better decisions. 
It is generally believed that the purpose of GAAP 
should be to fulfill the objectives of financial 
reporting. SFAC 1 defines these objectives which are 
not limited to financial statements; financial reporting 
encompasses the financial statements and other ways of 
communicating a c counting information such as annual 
reports, prospectuses, etc. Three objectives of 
financial reporting are discussed in SFAC 1: 1) "to 
provide information that is useful in making business 
and economic decisions" to both internal and external 
users of the information; 2) "to provide understandable 
information which wil 1 aid investors and creditors in 
predicting the future cash flows of a firm"; and 3) "to 
provide information relative to an enterprise's economic 
resources, the claims to those resources (obligations), 
and the effects of transactions, events, and 
circumstances that change resources and claims to 
r e sources" (Delaney, p.19). 
Since 1973, the FASB has been the official private 
sector in charge of establishing GAAP. The FASB took 
over responsibility from the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB) which had been charged with the responsibility of 
establishing accounting principles from 1959 to 1973. 
Although the FASB has the authority to set accounting 
standards, it is not a governmental agency; it is 
privately funded. However, its authority does depend a 
great deal on its endorsement by governmental bodies, 
especially the Securities and Exchange Commis s ion (SEC), 
and state-level regulatory agencies. It gets additional 
authority from other non-governmental organizations : the 
AICPA, the major auditing firms, the Fianancial 
Executives Institute , and the National Association of 
Accountants, etc. (Mi I !er and Redding, p.19). 
A general understanding of GAAP and the sources of 
its authority facilitates in gaining an understanding of 
the history of the standards overload controversy. The 
history of the debate can probably be traced to the 
first GAAP, because businesses have never embraced the 
idea that an outside source should have the ability to 
dictate what a business should do or how it should do 
it. However, in discussing the question of whether or 
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not different accounting standards should be established 
for smal I and/or privately held companies, it is only 
necessary to go back to 1974. This is the year that the 
Am erican Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
formed the committee on Generally Acc epted Principles 
for Smaller and/or Closely Held Businesses. For the 
committee, two areas were at issue: 1 ) measurement rules 
and 2) disclosure rules. Th e committee felt that 
measurement rules must apply "across the board" ( Lippit t 
and Oliver, p .53). In other wo rds , "measurement rules 
must be applied to the general-purpose financial 
statements of all entities because the mea surement 
process sho uld be independent of the nature of their 
users and their interest in resulting measures" (Knutson 
and Wichmann, p.54). How ever, the committee was more 
open to the possibility of a standards overload 
regarding disclosure rules; it decided that smal I and/or 
privately held businesses may be subject to 
unnecessarily extensive and financially burdensome 
disclosure standards (Lippitt and Oliver, p.54). The 
committee suggested that those disclosures "requi red by 
GAAP in t he financial statements of all companies should 
be distingui shed from those merely providing additional 
or ana l ytical data . These additional or analytical 
disclosures should be kept separate within the financial 
statements when they are presented" (Knutson and 
Wichm a nn, p.40). 
In 1975, a committee of the Ac counting Standards 
Division of the AICPA was formed to examine the 
st a ndards overload issue. Its findings and suggest i ons 
generally correspond with those of the previous 
committee. In 1980, the Special Committee on Small and 
Medium Sized Firms was formed by the AICPA; it suggested 
the formation of "a special committee to study 
a l t e r native means of providing relief from accounting 
standards which are not effective for smal 1 businesses" 
(Knutson and Wichmann, p . 40). As a re s ult, in 1981 the 
Special Committee on Accounting Standards was created; 
this committee was co-sponsored by the FASS. In 1984, 
the Special Committee issued its final report to the 
FASS . It recommended that the FASS: 1) "Immediately 
reconsider unnecessarily costly and burdomsome 
requirements, such as those that apply to leases and 
in c ome tax," 2) " Make simp l icity its goa l in writing new 
rules and revising new ones," and 3) " Consider whether, 
in certain situations, diffe r ent disclosure or 
measurement rules might be appropriate for privately -
owned companies" <Knutson and Wichmann, p.40) . 
In addition to the special committees formed in 
1981, the FASB offered an Invitation to Comment: 
Financial Reporting by Private and Smal I Public 
Companies on the subject of the alledged standa r ds 
overload problem. This wa s a major research effo r t with 
the objective of discovering how the costs and benefits 
of c omplying with financial repor t ing requiremen t s 
differ for sm a l I companies and the users of their 
financial information. This Invit a tion to Comment 
re c eived an unusually large number of resp o n s es. Bas e d 
on the consideration of the Invitation to Comment and 
other research by the AICPA and FEI, the FASB con c luded 
that smal I businesses do incur diffe r ent relative costs 
and benefit s as a r e sult of c omplying with financial 
a c c o unting an d repo r ting requirements in some areas 
(Wishon, p.101). Some areas had already been taken care 
of: earnings per share, business segment data, certain 
supplementary information about oil and gas producing 
activies, proforma results of purchase business 
combinations. Smal 1 businesses did not have to disclose 
this information. 
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The FASB recommended that there should be one set 
of GAAP for all companies, but private or small public 
companies should be exempt from some disclosures based 
on cost/benefit analysis. Overal 1, the FASB recommended 
that the special circumstances of small business should 
be considered by the FASB on an issue-by-issue basis for 
each project on the FASB's agenda. 
As has been stated, it is generally held that the 
purpose of GAAP should be able to fulfil 1 the objectives 
of financial reporting. ls this purpose served for both 
smal 1 and/or privately held companies and for large 
companies? To an s wer this question, a definition of 
"small" and/or privately held company must be developed. 
Williams defines a public company as one whose 
securities are traded in a public market o r one that i s 
required to file with the securities and exchange 
commission (p. 1298). A priv a tely held company is 
defined as one that is not a public company. Ho wever, 
the definition of "small" is not so easy. The FASB has 
found that size and ownership tests are not all that 
helpful in evaluating whether smal 1 business is affected 
by accounting standard s or in determining the 
consequences of standards in smal 1 business financial 
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statements ( Up to n and Ostergaard, p.95 ) . 
are often too restrictive or too broad. 
These tests 
The tests also 
fail to discriminate between companies of the same size, 
one of whi ch is stable, for example, the other of which 
is new and unstable. These tests may also fail to 
discriminate bet ween the norms of a particular industry: 
for example, a 100 employee manufacturer is considered 
smal 1 by its industry standards while a 100 employee 
computer software developer is considered large by its 
industry standards (Upton and Ostergaard, p.95 ) . _ 
Rathe r than trying to define "small" as many 
researchers have done, the FASB has focused on h o w 
specific issues in accounting affect different 
businesses. This approach, says Wayne S. Upton, a 
practice fellow at the FASB, is more difficult but is 
also more consistant with the board's intention to set 
standards for general purpose accounting (Upton and 
Ostergaard, p.5). Fr om this point onward in the paper, 
The term "small" wil I refer to both small public 
companies and privately held companies. 
Some critics disagree with the FASB ' s approach and 
feel that the elusive definition of "small " business in 
not necessary. Generally speaking, these critics 
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maintain, small businesses differ from large public 
companies in the users of their respective financial 
statements, the information necessary to be communicated 
to these users, the their cost/benefit ratios of 
complying with GAAP. 
The crit ics of the FASB's approach to the standards 
overload problem conclude that the major users of the 
financial information generated by a smal 1 business are 
its owners, its managers, and its creditors. As 
oppposed to a large public company, the owners of a 
small business are usually also its managers. It has 
been suggested that because smaller firms tend to be 
less diversified than larger firms, the owner-managers 
of a smal !er firm a re more interested in business risk 
than in the systematic risk or market risk that 
interests the more diversified owners of a large 
business. In other words, the owner-manager of a small 
business has more of his/her capita l invested in a 
single enterprise. "The resulting concentration of 
ownership suggests a relati vely smaller capital market 
and the lack of large numbers of buyers and sellers" 
(Plewa and Friedlob, p.56). Thus, there tend to be 
fewer changes in ownership in a smaller business than in 
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a larger business. 
As has already been mentioned, the management of a 
smal 1 business tends to consist of only a few people who 
are also owner s . These owner-managers tend to be 
knowledgeable of all parts of the business, because 
these individuals perfo r m multiple management roles. 
Because of the limited access of smal 1 business to 
capital markets, the role of bankers and other short-
term creditors is often very important. A survey abo u t 
s mal I business was conducted by R.D. Nair and Larry E. 
Rettenburg in 1983. These researchers asked businessmen 
and CPA's to rank "five reasons why [small] businessess 
re c eive audit, review or compilation services" Cp. 84). 
The rankings indicated that both groups believe that the 
main use of financial statements is for bank loan and 
credit arrangements (Nair and Rettenberg, p.84 ) . Thus 
in the eyes of the businessmen surveyed, bankers are the 
primary users of the financial statements of a smal 1 
business . 
The major u s ers of the of the financial statements 
of a sma l 1 business, as seen by the critics of current 
a ccounting standards and the FASB, have been identified. 
Do the financial info r mation needs of these users differ 
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from the needs of the users of the financial statements 
of a large business? When it comes to the owner-manager 
of the sma l 1 business, there is evidence that suggests 
the answer to this question is yes. Because the owners 
and the management of a smal I business tend to be the 
same individuals, they tend to receive good information 
internally and on a timely basis. Therefore, they are 
not so dependent upon formal financial statements like 
the owners (shareholders) of a large business who are 
far removed from management. It could be argued that 
formal financial statements may have little or no value 
to the owner-manager of a smal 1 business. 
Many of the people on both sides of the standards 
overload controversy might agree that, if the owner-
managers were the only potental users of the financial 
information generated by a sma l 1 business, there would 
be no need for compliance with GAAP on the part of small 
business. However, owner-managers are not the only 
users, and there is much disagreement as to whether or 
not the financial information needs of the creditors of 
a smal 1 business differ from the financial information 
needs of the creditors of a large business. Many critics 
of current GAAP believe that the needs of the creditors, 
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usually bankers, of a small business do differ. This 
difference stems from the fact that smal I businesses 
often have limited access to capital markets. 
Short-term creditors often require systematic 
financial reporting information. A case can 
thus be made for making the focus of small 
business financial reporting the liquidity 
information needs of their short-term 
creditors, not general purpose GAAP, which 
focuses more upon income measurement " (Lippitt 
and 01 iver, p . 55). 
In other words, creditors need a different type of 
financial reporting that focuses on their specific needs 
rather than that which is supplied in multi-purpose 
financial statements. The focus, say supporters of this 
contention, should be on liquidity -- the ability to 
repay debt, rather than on the periodic measurement of 
income. 
Advocates of current GAAP tend to expand the notion 
of "financial information user" and find fault with the 
narrow definition of "user" that critics of current GAAP 
often employ -- owner-manager and creditor. These 
advocates of current GAAP hold that tll_ the possible 
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users of a smal I business's financial statements should 
be considered. Thus, in addition to owner-manager and 
creditor of a small business, the litigation claimant, 
limited partner, bonding agent, absentee owner, 
government regulators, and others must be taken into 
account (Upton and Ostergaard, p.95). The financial 
statements and their accompanying notes are often the 
only sources of information for these users. 
External users take it for granted that 
published financial reports are presented in 
accordance with GAAP. They want financial 
data to be reliable, relevant, consistant, and 
in a form that facilitates comparisons, and 
they rely on GAAP for providing an accurate 
financial picture of a particular business 
<Korn, p.16). 
Thus, these proponants of current GAAP refute the idea 
that abbreviated financial statements, such as those 
focusing on short-term liquidity for the benefit of 
creditors, would be sufficient for all the users of the 
financial information of a smal I business. 
Advocates of current GAAP also refute the idea that 
financial statements focusing on start-term liquidity 
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would be sufficient even for bankers alone. For 
example, the ASC studied the standard analysis sheets of 
the major clearing banks. The study indicated that the 
analysis sheets were no more that a re-ordering and 
summary of information found on standard financial 
statements conforming with GAAP. "There was no 
indication that the typical bank manager needed any more 
information than was already contained in the financial 
statements" (Lawson, p.21). 
Because there is obviously no consensus on the 
definition of "smal 1 business" or how exactly a small 
business differs from large business in terms of its 
users and the needs of its users, it may be necessary to 
perform some sort of cost/benefit analysis to see if 
certain standards are an unnecessary burden on small 
business. The costs incurred by a small business as a 
result of complying with GAAP may be relatively higher 
than those costs incurred by a larger company. This 
inequality results because a smal 1 firm with limited 
staff and resources will probably need to hire an 
outside CPA to do the work; a large firm could just re-
assign one of its salaried internal accountants. 
Another reason for the relatively higher costs of 
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complying with GAAP is that the cost of CPA services for 
a small business is greater than twice as much per 
do] lar of sale revenue as compared to a larger business 
(Plewa and Friedlob, p.55). The greater the number of 
or the more complex the accounting standards, the 
greater is the pressure put on a smal 1 business's CPA; 
because the usually smal I CPA firm cannot reduce the 
pressure via specialization, fees are higher. Another 
cost of complying with GAAP, although difficult to 
quantify, is the opportunity cost borne by a small 
business: money that could be spent to improve the 
business is instead spent on financial statements. 
Thus, "small business owners pay proportionately much 
higher costs for the same benefit -- audited financial 
statements" (Plewa and Friedlob, p.55). 
Complying with GAAP results in the benefits 
provided by unqualified audited financial statements. 
Advocates of current GAAP believe that the value of 
audited financial statements cannot be overemphasized. 
Plewa and Friedlob identify these benefits: 1) lower 
interest rates or "no increase in financing costs from 
inadequate information; 2) "the ability to take 
advantage of investment opportunities when financing is 
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readily available," and 3) "availablility of adequate 
data to make better management decisions" (p. 55). 
Plewa and Friedlob may face some disagreement about 
their third point, but there would be little 
disagreement with their first two points. 
Although there are benefits received from complying 
with GAAP, critics of current GAAP maintain that full 
GAAP financial statements are not, or should not be, 
necessary for smal 1 businesses to receive these 
benefits. This fact has already been recognized to a 
certain extent say researchers Lippitt and Oliver 
Where substantial differences have been 
recognized, different GAAP's have evolved 
If there is room for different reporting 
standards based on specialized industry 
practices, isn't there also room for those 
bases on size? (p. 56). 
With this quote, Lippitt and Oliver refer to SFAC 2. 
Smal 1 businesses are already exempt from reporting 
earnings per share information, segment information, 
supplimental inflation disclosures, and interim 
information. Some critics of current GAAP maintain that 
smal I business should also be relieved of the burden of 
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reporting on some or all of the following: the equity 
method of accounting for investing in common stock, 
capitalization of interest, imputed interest on 
receiv a bles and payables, leases, interperiod tax 
al location, markerable securities, and other item s 
(Williams, p.1299). Many researchers have suggested as 
a solution to the alledged standards overload problem 
alternatives to current GAAP. These various 
alternatives fall under four general categories: 1 ) 
simplfying GAAP for al 1 companies, 2)providing 
additional disclosure relief for small companies, 
3)providing accounting measurement relief for small 
companies, and 4) developing a simplified alternative 
basis of accounting for smal I companies. 
The first suggested solution to the alledged 
problem is to simplify GAAP for all companies. The 
argument here is that current GAAP is not only a 
standards overload for smal I busines but for large 
business as we! 1. Upton and Ostergaard believe that 
this is "the ideal answer ... but more often than not, 
however, universal simplification is impossible when 
complex issues and transactions are involved" (p. 98). 
The second suggested solution is to provide additional 
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disclosure relief for small companies; this solution 
entails relieving small companies of the burden of 
disclosing information about leases, capitalization of 
interest, etc. just as small companies are currently 
exempt from reporting earnings per share information, 
segment information, etc. The next suggested solution 
is to provide differential measurement for smal 1 
compan ies. The implementation of t his solution would 
allow smal 1 companies "to apply simpl ified measurement 
techniques to certain assets or liabilities" (Upton and 
Ostergaard, p.98). The final suggested solution is to 
develop a simplied alternative basis of accounting for 
smal 1 compan ies. 
this solution. 
There are many possible variations of 
For example, Plewa and Friedl ob 
recommend a reporting continuum of smal 1 business. 
There are six increasingly simplified levels to their 
continuum: level six requires full accrual GAAP; level 
five requires ful 1 accrual GAAP with only currently 
allowable statement exclusions; level four requires full 
accrua l with footnote disclosures of GAAP departures; 
l evel three requires only ful 1 accrual; level two 
requires federal income tax basis; level one requires 
cash basis (p. 56). A smal 1 business would be able to 
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choose the least complex of continuum choices that would 
fulfil 1 its needs and its users needs, and it would 
still be ab le to receive an unqualified audit report. It 
must be stressed that any of these suggested solutions 
would r ender the financial statements of different 
companies inconsistant with one another and thus reduce 
comparability between different companies. 
There are many groups interested in financial 
accounting and the nature of the interests of these 
groups differ. Governmental regulators are interested 
because of their objective to promote the public welfare 
via protecting the capital markets from inefficient 
al lo c ation of capital resources; they favo r reliable , 
c onsistant, comparable measurements and greater 
disclosure of information to prevent the publication of 
false or misleading information which could lead to poor 
decisions by the public and thus inefficient allocation 
of capital resources. 
Current and potential investors and creditors, the 
providers of the capital resources used by a business 
are also interested in financial accounting and 
financial statements. By using the information in the 
financial statements, they wil 1 be able to make better 
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informed decisions to reduce their risks and increase 
their rates of return. Therefore, these users, 
especially creditors, also tend to favor reliable, 
consistant, comparable measurements and increased 
disclosure of financial information . 
The management of a business is ob v iously 
interested in financial accounting and the financial 
statements . The information conveyed to the public 
affects the business ' s share of the allocation of 
capita l resources. The more "in control " management is 
regarding the measurement of data and the disclosure of 
information, the easier it is to manipulate the 
conversion of the data into positive information. Even 
management that does not consciously try to manipulate 
data has a tendancy to be overly optimistic about the 
performance of the business . Therefore, management 
tends to favor less stringent measurement and disclosure 
requirements that wil 1 al l ow it to present the financial 
information of the business as favorably as possible . 
Independent auditors are also interested in the 
standards setting process and the measurement and 
disclos u re of financia l i nformation. It is the 
responsibi l ity of the i n dependent auditor to add 
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credibility to the financial statements of a business by 
issuing an opinion on them as an objective and 
independent outsider. Because an independent auditor 
risks her reputation with every opinion, she would 
prefer "the standards setting process ... directed 
toward producing more auditable information" (Mil !er and 
Redding, p.24). 
The differences among these groups, the 
governmental regulators, current and potential investors 
and creditors, management, and independent auditors, 
must be resolved. The way this is accomplished is by 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
An important argument of those who do not endorse 
th e standards overload theory is the assertion that 
"uniformity in the practices used by al I companies is 
generally preferable to diversity" (Mil !er and Redding, 
p. 15). This idea has its roots in the idea that "valid, 
and thus useful, comparisons among alternative 
investments can be made only if the financial 
information is c o mparable (Mil !er and Redding, p.15). 
If material, real economic differences exist but are not 
disclosed in the financial statements, the the users of 
the financial statements will not be able to make the 
25 
correct decisions . Uniformity in practices also helps 
to protect the users of the financial statements from 
unethical or overly enthusiastic managers manipulating 
the information to show their company in a better light. 
Uniformity helps to protect independent auditors also, 
because " the rules provide an external basis for their 
judgements. Auditors are able to express an opinion 
that the financial statements are in compliance with 
GAAP rather than that the financial statements present 
the "truth" (Miller and Redding, p.16). 
In conc l usion, it seems that despite claims to the 
contrary, current GAAP, by requiring with a few 
exeptions the same measurement and disclosure rules for 
all companies, is balancing the various needs and 
desires of those groups interested in financial 
accounting and financial statements of al I companies, 
large and small alike . 
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